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Abstract
There have been many successes in constructing explicit non-malleable codes for various classes of
tampering functions in recent years, and strong existential results are also known. In this work we
ask the following question:
When can we rule out the existence of a non-malleable code for a tampering class F?
First, we start with some classes where positive results are well-known, and show that when
these classes are extended in a natural way, non-malleable codes are no longer possible. Specifically,
we show that no non-malleable codes exist for any of the following tampering classes:
Functions that change d/2 symbols, where d is the distance of the code;
Functions where each input symbol affects only a single output symbol;
Functions where each of the n output bits is a function of n− logn input bits.
Furthermore, we rule out constructions of non-malleable codes for certain classes F via reductions
to the assumption that a distributional problem is hard for F , that make black-box use of the
tampering functions in the proof. In particular, this yields concrete obstacles for the construction of
efficient codes for NC, even assuming average-case variants of P 6⊆ NC.
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1 Introduction
Since the introduction of non-malleable codes (NMC) by Dziembowski, Pietrzak, and Wichs
in 2010, there has been a long line of work constructing non-malleable codes for various
classes [43]. A plethora of upper bounds, explicit and implicit (to varying degrees), have been
shown for a wealth of classes of tampering functions. However, to our knowledge, relatively
little is known about when non-malleability is impossible. In this work, we initiate the study
of the limits to non-malleability.
Non-malleability for a class F is defined via the following “tampering” experiment:
Let f ∈ F denote a tampering function.
1. Encode message m using a (public) randomized encoding algorithm: c← E(m),
2. Tamper the codeword: c˜ = f(c),
3. Decode the tampered codeword (with public decoder): m˜ = D(c˜).
Roughly, the encoding scheme, (E,D), is non-malleable for a class F , if for any f ∈ F the
result of the above experiment, m˜, is either identical to the original message, or completely
unrelated. More precisely, the outcome of a F -tampering experiment should be simulatable
without knowledge of the message m (using a special flag “same” to capture the case of
unchanged message).
[43] showed that, remarkably, this definition is achievable for any F such that loglog|F| <
n − 2 · log(1/), where n is the length of the codeword (the input/output of functions in
F), and  parameterizes the quality of simulation possible (see Definition 3). However the
definition is not achievable in general. It is easy to observe that if F is the class of all
functions, there is a trivial tampering attack: decode, maul, and re-encode. This same
observation rules out the possibility of efficient codes against efficient tampering, as this
attack only requires that decoding and outputting constants conditioned on the result is in
the tampering class. By a similar argument, the decoding function of a non-malleable code
with respect to the distribution formed by encoding a random one-bit message can be seen
as existence of hard decision problem for the tampering class. (This, in turn, informs us of
where to hope for unconditional constructions.)
In this work, we give a variety of impossibility results for non-malleable codes, in disparate
tampering regimes. We present 3 unconditional impossibility results for various classes, which
hold even for inefficient NMC. These impossibility results apply to classes that are simple and
natural extensions of classes with well-known and efficient NMC constructions. Additionally,
we rule out constructions of NMC for a wide range of complexity classes with security
reductions that are only given black-box access to the tampering function. This result is
more technically complex than the previous ones, and requires the introduction of a new
notion of fine-grained black-box reductions appropriate for the non-malleability setting, as
we explain below. This result allows us to study the minimal assumptions necessary for
achieving NMC for complexity classes contained in P (e.g., NC1), and to rule out such NMC
constructions (with black-box reductions) from minimal average-case hardness assumptions.
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To our knowledge, the only previously-known impossibility results beyond the simple
observations above, are related to other variants of NMC. These include bounds on locality
of locally decodable and updatable NMC, bounds on continuous NMC, and impossibility of
“look-ahead” or “block-wise” NMC (which also follows from a simple observation). There are
also several bounds related to the rate of NMC. We discuss these and other related works in
Section 1.4. In contrast, our results hold regardless of rate. In fact, our lower bounds rule
out even message spaces of size two or three.
1.1 Strictly Impossible
We identify 3 tampering regimes where non-malleability is strictly impossible.
On tampering functions that change d/2 symbols, where d is the distance of the
code
It is common to present non-malleable codes as a strict relaxation of error-correcting codes
(ECC). It is easy to see that ECC are NMC against tampering that changes up to the allowed
fraction of symbols, but since NMC only require correctness of decoding in the absence of
errors, they can provide “security” for tampering functions that ECC cannot, in particular
functions that can modify most, or even all, symbols of the codeword. This suggests that we
could potentially construct NMC for tampering classes that are strictly larger than any class
for which ECC could exist. However, no such construction is known: all NMC results that
allow to modify more symbols, also require that the computation of the tampering function
is restricted in some way. In contrast, ECC do not place any restrictions on the tampering
adversary beyond the limit to the number of modified symbols.
In the current work we ask whether this trade-off is in fact necessary. Specifically, can we
construct NMC that allow for modifying more symbols of the codeword than ECC without
placing any other restrictions on the tampering? Note that for ECC it is known that if
the distance of the code is d, it is not possible to correct when d/2 symbols are modified,
but there are constructions that allow for error correction after arbitrary modification of at
most d/2− 1 symbols (e.g., Reed-Solomon ECC achieve this bound). Indeed, for the case
of potentially inefficient coding schemes, the above is tight: A coding scheme with distance
d implies error correction against d/2 − 1 errors. Thus, fixing a message space M and a
codeword space C, we consider the optimal ECC for this message and codeword space, which
has some distance d (and therefore can correct d/2− 1 errors). We then ask whether one
can construct a non-malleable code with message spaceM and codeword space C against
the class of functions that may arbitrarily tamper with d/2 codeword symbols.
We fully resolve our question. We show that for message space of size 2, non-malleable
codes that tolerate arbitrary modification of even up to d − 1 symbols are possible (via a
repetition code, see Section 3). On the other hand, for message space of size greater than 2,
it is impossible to construct non-malleable codes with distance d for tampering functions
that arbitrarily modify d/2 codeword symbols. This indicates that for message space larger
than 2, in order to obtain improved parameters beyond what is possible with error correcting
codes, imposing some additional restrictions on the tampering function is necessary.
On tampering functions where each input symbol affects at most one output
symbol
In their recent work, Ball et al. [17] presented unconditional NMC for the class of output-local
functions, where each output symbol depends on a bounded number of input symbols. As an
intermediate step, they also considered the class of functions that are both input and output
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local. The class of input-local functions is the class of functions where each input symbol
affects a bounded number of output symbol. A natural question is whether non-malleable
codes can be constructed for the class of input-local functions, where for codeword length n,
each input bit affects  n output bits.
In this work, we answer this question negatively in a very strong sense. We show that
even achieving NMC for 1-input local functions (where each input bit affects at most one
output bit) is impossible. In fact, our proof shows an even stronger result: the impossibility
holds even if each input symbol can only affect the same single output symbol. That is,
it is impossible to construct NMC for the tampering class that allows to change only one
codeword symbol in a way that depends on the input (while the other symbols may be
changed into constant values). Stated like this, this result can also be viewed as an extension
of our first result above on the maximum number of symbols that can be modified in a
non-malleable code.
On tampering functions where each output symbol depends on n− log(1/(4))
input symbols
Here we move on to consider achieving NMC for output-local tampering functions. The prior
work of [17] constructed efficient NMC for tampering functions with locality nc, for constant
c < 1. The size of the class of all output-local tampering functions (with locality sufficiently
smaller than n) is also bounded in size and therefore NMC for this class follow from the
existential results of [43]. A natural question is how large can the output-locality be?
We prove the impossibility of -non-malleable codes (see Definition 3) for the class of
(n − log(1/(4)))-output-local tampering functions. In addition to the above motivation,
parity over n bits is average-case hard for this class.1 Therefore, our impossibility result can
be viewed as a “separation” between average-case hardness and non-malleability, as it exhibits
a class for which we have average-case hardness bounds, but cannot construct non-malleable
codes for. Furthermore, the class F ′ constructed in our lower bound proof has size only
4n · 22n−log(1/(4)) , which in turn means that log log |F ′| = n− log(1/(4)) = n− log(1/) + 2.
On the other hand, the aforementioned result of Dziembowski et al. [43] shows existence of
an -non-malleable code for any class F such that log log |F| ≤ n − 2 log(1/). Thus, our
lower bound result is close to matching the existential upper bound.
Remark: deterministic vs. randomized decoding
The standard (and original) definition of NMC requires deterministic decoding and perfect
correctness, although some later work took advantage of randomized decoding.2 We note
that our lower bound for the class of input-local functions holds for standard schemes (with
deterministic decoding and perfect correctness). Our lower bound (with  = 14n ) for the class
of n − log(n) output-local functions holds even for coding schemes that have randomized
decoding and perfect correctness. The lower bound for the class of functions that change d/2
symbols holds even for coding schemes with randomized decoding and imperfect correctness.
1 Note that, even arbitrary decision trees of depth n− 1 have no advantage in computing the parity of n
bits with respect to the uniform distribution. [22]
2 For the class of output-local functions (where each output depends on at most ` inputs) we have explicit
constructions with randomized decoding (and  = negl(n)) for ` < n/ logn [17], whereasconstructions
with deterministic decoding are known for locality up to n1/2− for small . [28, 15].
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1.2 Impossibility of Black-Box Security Reductions
In recent work, unconditional constructions of non-malleable codes for progressively larger
tampering classes, such as NC0 [17, 29, 15] and AC0 [29, 15], have been presented. In fact,
the construction of [15] remains secure for circuit depths as large as Θ(log(n)/ log log(n)).
Moreover, due to the impossibility of efficient NMC for all of P, extending their result
to obtain unconditional NMC for circuits with asymptotically larger depth would require
separating P from NC1, a problem that is well out of reach with current complexity-theoretic
techniques. However, rather than ruling out such constructions entirely, in this regime we
ask what are the minimal assumptions necessary for achieving non-malleable codes for NC1,
as well as other classes F that are believed to be strictly contained in P.
The above question was partially addressed by Ball et al. [18, 16] in their recent work,
where they presented a general framework for construction of NMC for various classes F in
the CRS model and under cryptographic assumptions. Instantiating their framework for NC1
yields a computational, CRS-model construction of 1-bit NMC for NC1, assuming there is a
distributional problem that is hard for NC1, but easy for P. Moreover, such distributional
problems for NC1 can be based on worst-case assumptions.3
In this work, we ask whether 1-bit non-malleable codes for NC1 in the standard (no-CRS)
model can be constructed from the assumption that there are distributional problems that
are hard for NC1 but easy for P. Recall that this assumption is minimal, since the decoding
function of a 1-bit non-malleable code for NC1 w.r.t. the distribution of random encodings of
1 bit messages yields such a distributional problem.
We provide a negative answer, showing that, under black-box reductions (restricting use
of the tampering function in the security proof to be black-box), this is impossible.
Specifically, we define a notion of black-box reductions for the setting of 1-bit non-
malleable codes (E,D) against a complexity class F to a distributional problem (Ψ, L) that
is hard for F . This type of reduction is required to use the “adversary” – i.e. the tampering
function in our setting – in a black-box manner, but is not restricted in its use of the
underlying assumptions. To motivate our new notion, we begin by recalling the notions of
reductions in complexity theory and cryptography, and how they are used.
Reductions in Complexity Theory
A reduction is a technique in complexity theory that is used to show that Problem 1 is as
hard as Problem 2. For example, the famous Cook-Levin theorem showed that SAT (Boolean
satisfiability) is as hard as any problem in NP, by showing a reduction from any problem in
NP to SAT. In more detail, a reduction R, is an algorithm that receives as input an algorithm
A that solves Problem 1 and uses it to solve Problem 2. Typically, R will only access A
in an input/output manner as a subroutine (also known as oracle access and denoted as
RA). When a reduction R uses a solver A in this way, R is known as a black-box reduction.
Intuitively, in this case, R does not care how A solves Problem 1, it just cares that A exhibits
the correct input-output behavior. Therefore, the reduction R should still be able to solve
Problem 2, even when A is computationally unbounded. In fact, in the Cook-Levin theorem,
only a single oracle query is made by the reduction to the algorithm solving SAT.
When is a reduction R between two problems useful? Note that if R is in a complexity
class that can solve Problem 2, then existence of such a reduction R is tautological, since R
can simply ignore its oracle and solve Problem 2 on its own (so no relationship is demonstrated
3 Assuming ⊕L/poly 6⊆ NC1 yields a distributional problem since randomized encodings for ⊕L/poly are
known to exist [13, 21, 41, 14].
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about the relative hardness of the problems). This is why in the Cook-Levin theorem the
reduction is required to be polynomial time. Reductions are also useful since they allow us to
draw conclusions about the relationships between different complexity classes. For example,
using the Cook-Levin theorem, we conclude that if there exists a polynomial time algorithm
for solving SAT then there exists a polynomial time algorithm for all of NP (i.e. P = NP).
Note that there is actually a subtlety here: In order for the above to hold, we need that
whenever A is polynomial time, RA is also polynomial time. This holds trivially for the case of
polynomial time, since the class P is closed under composition. However, as we will see later,
this closure does not necessarily hold in some of the settings we consider. Many variations on
reductions beyond the setting of the Cook-Levin Theorem and NP-completeness have been
considered in complexity theory. For example, polynomial time reductions have no utility
when P is the object of study. Instead, the theory of P-completeness uses NC-computable
reductions to argue about whether or not problems in P can be parallelized. Another such
example is the theory of fine-grained complexity, which seeks to understand the exact (or,
more exact) complexity of problems in P. Fine-grained reductions allow one to argue that
a problem cannot be solved in, for example, O(n2−) time (for any  > 0), by reduction
from another problem believed to require Ω(n2−o(1)) time. For this reasoning to hold, such a
fine-grained reduction must run in sub-quadratic time, and moreover it can make at most
no(1) queries to an oracle defined on instances of length n if it is to remain useful. As we will
see, this tension between the length of the inputs queried to the oracle and the number of
such queries will also be relevant in our setting.
Reductions in Cryptography
Reductions in cryptography are exactly like reductions in complexity theory. For example, the
seminal result of [54] proves by reduction that breaking a pseudorandom function (Problem 1)
is as hard as breaking a pseudorandom generator (Problem 2). In order to prove this, they
present a reduction R such that that given an algorithm A that breaks the constructed
pseudorandom function, RA breaks the underlying pseudorandom generator. Note that since
R only has oracle access to A, again R does not care how A works, as long as it exhibits
input-output behavior that qualifies it as a valid distinguisher between a pseudorandom and
random function. Thus, R is black-box. As before, R is only useful if it is polynomial time,
since otherwise R can break the pseudorandom generator on its own. Furthermore, we again
want to use the existence of the reduction to draw conclusions about the security relationship
between the pseudorandom function and the pseudorandom generator. Here we want to show
that if there exists a polynomial-time algorithm that breaks the pseudorandom function, then
there exists a polynomial-time algorithm that breaks the pseudorandom generator. Therefore,
we want it to be the case that whenever A is polynomial time, RA is also polynomial time.
This trivially holds, as before, since P is closed under composition. However, in the following
we will consider cases where this type of closure does not necessarily hold. For example,
when A and R are in NC1, RA may no longer be in NC1 (in fact RA could have depth up to
log2(n)). We therefore need to include a notion of closure under composition as one of the
requirements of a black-box reduction in our setting.
A fine-grained setting: Security reductions for non-malleable codes
What would a security reduction in the setting of non-malleable codes look like? In this case,
we want to show that breaking the non-malleable code (Problem 1) is as hard as breaking
distributional problem (Ψ, L) (Problem 2). Here, an algorithm that breaks the non-malleable
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code simply consists of a tampering function f . A reduction R is provided black-box access
to the tampering function f and must use it to break the distributional problem (Ψ, L).
First, note that since we assume R is black-box, R is only allowed to use f as a subroutine
(gives it inputs and obtains its output), regardless of how f performs its computation. Thus,
as in all the cases discussed above, we require that Rf break the distributional problem
(Ψ, L), even in the case that f is not contained in F . Note that the distributional problem
(Ψ, L) is easy for polynomial-time. Therefore, for the reduction to be non-trivial, R must be
in a complexity class that does not contain P. Indeed, since we only assume that (Ψ, L) is
hard for F , R must be contained in F in order for us to draw any conclusions (otherwise, we
cannot rule out the possibility that R simply ignores its oracle and solves (Ψ, L) on its own).
Furthermore, as discussed above, the point of the reduction is to be able to conclude that if
there is a tampering function f in F that breaks the non-malleable code, then there exists
an algorithm in F that breaks the distributional problem (Ψ, L). Therefore, it is not enough
that R ∈ F , and we actually need that whenever f ∈ F , Rf ∈ F . We will then use the fact
that Rf breaks (Ψ, L) and is used to obtain a contradiction to the hardness of (Ψ, L) for F .
Overall, at a high level (skipping some technical details), we require two properties of a
black-box reduction R from (E,D) to (Ψ, L):
If the tampering function f succeeds in breaking the non-malleable code, the reduction,
Rf , should succeed, regardless of whether f ∈ F . This represents the fact that R uses f
in a black-box manner.
For any f ∈ F , Rf must also be in F , and in particular, R itself must be in F .
This represents the fact that the black-box reduction R should allow one to obtain a
contradiction to the assumption that (Ψ, L) is hard for F , in the case that (E,D) is
malleable by F .
Note that for arbitrary classes F (unlike the usual polynomial-time adversaries typically used
in cryptography), the fact that R ∈ F and f ∈ F does not necessarily imply that Rf ∈ F .
This introduces some additional complexity in our definitions and also requires us to restrict
our end results to classes F that behave appropriately under composition.
We present general impossibility results for constructing 1-bit non-malleable codes for a
class F from a distributional problem that is hard for F but easy for P. We present three
types of results: results ruling out security parameter preserving reductions for tampering
class F that behave nicely under composition; results ruling out “approximate” security
parameter preserving reductions for tampering class F with slightly stronger compositional
properties; and results ruling out non-security parameter preserving reductions for tampering
class F that are fully closed under composition. See Definitions 21, 22 and Lemmas 31, 35, 37
for the formal statements.
Briefly, security parameter preserving reductions have the property that the reduction only
queries the adversary (in our case the tampering function) on the same security parameter
that it receives as input. The security parameter preserving reductions have been used in
constructions of leakage resilient circuit compilers [11]. The notion of “approximate” security
parameter preserving reductions is new to this work. Such reductions are parameterized by
polynomial functions `(·), u(·) and on input security parameter n, the reduction may query
the adversary on any security parameter in the range `(n) to u(n). This notion is somewhat
less restrictive than a security parameter preserving reduction. Finally, in a non-security
parameter preserving reduction, the reduction receives security parameter n as input and
may query the adversary on arbitrary security parameter n′. Note that n′(n) must be in
O(nc) for some constant c, since the reduction must be polynomial time. This notion allows
us to rule out the most general type of black-box reduction discussed above.
ITCS 2020
80:8 Limits to Non-Malleability
We can instantiate the tampering class F from our generic lemma statements with various
classes of interest. Our results on security parameter preserving and approximate security
parameter preserving reductions apply to the class NC1 as a special case. Our result ruling
out non-security parameter preserving reductions applies to the class (non-uniform) NC as a
special case. See Corollaries 32, 36, 38 for the formal statements. As the proofs are already
quite involved, we make the simplifying assumption of deterministic decoding and perfect
correctness. However, this is not inherent to the proof and we expect the results to extend
to coding schemes with imperfect correctness and randomized decoding.
Do reductions for NMC take the above form?
So far, in the non-malleable codes setting, results have either been unconditional (e.g. [43, 4])
or have been based on polynomial-hardness assumptions (e.g. [64, 2]). The results that are
based on polynomial-hardness assumptions have all used black-box security reductions, in the
standard polynomial-time sense [69]. Our notion is new since it captures a fine-grained setting
where the underlying distributional problem is, in fact, easy for polynomial-time algorithms.
As discussed above, this is the minimal computational hardness assumption necessary to
construct non-malleable codes for classes F for which we cannot prove unconditionally that
P 6⊆ F . While this type of reduction implicitly arises in the work of [18], our work is the
first to formally define and explore this notion of fine-grained black-box reductions in a
cryptographic setting.
1.3 Technical Overview
In order to prove impossibility of constructing non-malleable codes in different scenarios,
we need to show that any such code is malleable. Recall that for single-bit messages,
non-malleability is equivalent to showing that when applying the tampering function to a
randomly generated encoding of a random bit, the decoded value flips with probability at
most 1/2 + negl(n). Thus, proving that something is malleable, corresponds to showing that
the decoded value flips with probability at least 1/2 + 1/ poly(n). We will use this fact in
the following exposition.
1.3.1 On tampering functions that change d/2 symbols, where d is the
distance of the code
We observe that for any coding scheme, there must be some message, x∗, such that every
encoding of that message is at most distance d/2 from something that is likely to decode to
something other than x∗. Our tampering function will only modify encodings of x∗, and it
will do so by moving each encoding to one of these nearby points that decodes differently. We
claim that if there are at least 3 messages in the message space, then the output of decoding
with the tampering function described above depends on the input message (and thus cannot
be simulated). Indeed, when starting with message x∗ (which is encoded, tampered, and
decoded) there must be some other message y∗ 6= x∗ that is not output a majority of the
times by this process. On the other hand, when starting with y∗, since the tampering does
not change anything in this case, correctness of decoding means that y∗ should be output a
majority of times.
This argument falls apart if there are only two possible messages, and in this case a
repetition code with a decoding that outputs a fixed value on invalid codewords is, in fact,
non-malleable with respect to tampering functions that can change up to n− 1 symbols.
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1.3.2 On tampering functions where each input symbol affects at most
one output symbol
Consider any two codewords cx and cy corresponding to distinct messages, x and y. Now
consider any sequence of n codewords between cx and cy, made by altering one symbol at
a time. There must be two adjacent codewords, ci, ci+1, (differing on a single bit) in this
sequence that decode differently. Therefore, to tamper, simply output ci if the input is
an encoding of 0, and ci+1 otherwise. Because ci and ci+1 just differ on a single bit, the
tampering function has input locality 1.
1.3.3 On tampering functions where each output symbol depends on
n− log(1/(4)) input symbols
We begin by considering a simpler argument, that only rules out tampering functions of
output locality n − 1 (each output bit can depend on at most n − 1 input bits), where n
is the bit length of the codeword. To illustrate the idea in the locality n− 1 case, we also
assume that the decoding algorithm is deterministic. We consider two cases and show that
each case leads to a different tampering attack:
Case 1: Given the first n− 1 bits of the codeword, the codeword decodes to the same
bit b, regardless of whether the final bit is 0 or 1. In this case, the tampering function
contains a hardwired valid codeword encoding 0 and a valid codeword encoding 1. The
tampering function derives the bit b, given only the first n− 1 bits (since the decoded bit
b is independent of the final bit) and replaces the codeword with the hardwired encoding
of 1− b.
Case 2: Given the first n− 1 bits of the codeword, the codeword decodes to 0 if the final
bit is set to b and decodes to 1 if the final bit is set to 1− b. In this case, the tampering
function just flips the final bit, causing the decoding to flip.
The key observation is that we can extend the attacks for Cases 1 and 2 above to tampering
functions of output locality n− log(1/(4)). We will sketch the special case corresponding
to extending to  = 14n (and locality (n − log(n))), to rule out non-malleable codes with
negligible error. Case 1 now corresponds to the case that, for a randomly generated codeword,
when the first n− log(n) bits of the codeword are fixed and the remaining log(n) bits are
set at random, the decoded value remains the same with probability at least 1/2 + 1/(4n)
In this case, the tampering function gets the first n− log(n) bits, randomly sets the final
log(n) bits and decodes to obtain a bit b. Then, the tampering function succeeds in flipping
the encoding with probability 1/2 + 1/(4n) by replacing the codeword with the hardwired
encoding of 1− b.
Case 2 now corresponds to the case that for a randomly generated codeword, when the
first n− log(n) bits of the codeword are fixed and the remaining log(n) bits are set at random,
the decoded value flips with probability at least 1/2− 1/(4n). Note that the decoded value
never flips when the randomly chosen log(n) bits happen to be the same as the original
value, which occurs with probability 1/n. Thus, if the final log(n) bits are chosen at random,
conditioned on being different from the original value, then the decoded value must flip with
probability at least 1/2−1/(4n)1−1/n ≥ 1/2 + 1/(4n). In this case, the tampering function ignores
the first part of the codeword and simply sets the final log(n) bits at random, conditioned on
the value being different from the original value. Then, the tampering function succeeds in
flipping the value of the encoding with probability at least 1/2 + 1/(4n).
Our final argument for n− log(1/(4))-locality holds even for randomized decoding.
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1.3.4 Impossibility of Black-Box Security Reductions
We begin by describing our proof showing the impossibility of a black-box, security-parameter
preserving reduction, from NMC against the tampering class NC1, to a distributional problem
that is hard for NC1. The proof for approximately security parameter preserving reductions
is essentially the same, and so we subsequently describe the extension to impossibility of a
black-box, non-security-parameter preserving reduction, from non-malleable codes against
the tampering class NC, to a distributional problem that is hard for NC.
Our proof proceeds via the meta-reduction technique. Specifically, consider a black-box
reduction R, reducing the security of a single-bit non-malleable code against NC1 to a
distributional problem that is hard for NC1. The form that this reduction takes, is that it
submits codewords c to the tampering function f and gets back (tampered) codewords y as
responses. The main idea is to begin with a tampering function f , which is not in NC1. This
tampering function receives a codeword c, decodes it to obtain the bit b and then submits a
randomly generated encoding of the bit 1− b. In the proof, we assume the existence of a
reduction R such that Rf breaks the underlying distributional problem (this follows from
the definition of a black-box reduction). We then switch from f to a tampering function f ′
that is in NC1, which behaves as follows: Upon receiving a codeword c, f simply responds
with a (hardcoded) random codeword c′ that encodes a random bit, independent of the
bit that is obtained when the decoding algorithm is applied to c. This switch is desirable,
since then Rf ′ will be in NC1 (note that we are guaranteed that Rf ′ is in NC1, since one
of the properties of R is that whenever the tampering function f ′ is in NC1, then Rf ′ must
also be in NC1). It remains, however, to show that Rf ′ succeeds in breaking the underlying
distributional problem, which then implies that the underlying distributional problem is
not hard for NC1. In order to ensure this, we use a hybrid argument, where responses to
queries from R are switched one by one, from responses according to f to responses according
to f ′. In each step, we must show that the reduction remains successful in breaking the
underlying distributional problem. Importantly, in the i-th hybrid, the first i− 1 responses
are answered according to f , the i-th response and on are answered according to f ′. Since R
is in NC1, we argue that if R can distinguish the (i− 1)-st and i-th hybrids, then we obtain
a tampering attack in NC1 on the non-malleable code. To do this, we construct a tampering
function that hardwires the input to R, the transcript (queries and responses) and entire
state of R for the first i− 1 queries made from R to f , the i-th query along with the value
b that it decodes to, and the responses to the queries i+ 1 and on. Then, given an input
codeword c′, the tampering function inserts this value as the response to the i-th query, runs
the reduction R from this point on (given the state of R at the point of the response to the
i-th query) and responds with the random hardwired queries upon any future queries from
R. If R distinguishes between Hybrids i − 1 and i, then the above yields a distinguisher
between randomly generated encodings of the bit b, versus randomly generated encodings of
a random bit. It is not hard to see that such a distinguisher immediately yields a tampering
attack, since it can be used to predict the underlying encoded value and the tampering
attack can then replace the codeword with an encoding of a bit which is the opposite of the
predicted bit.
In the above, note that it is crucial that the reduction is security parameter preserving.
Indeed, if R queries codewords c′ that are very short (say length log2(n)) then we can no
longer use R to obtain a valid tampering function against the non-malleable code. This is
because R has size poly(n) and depth log(n), which is not in NC1 relative to input length
log2(n). To deal with this problem, we take advantage of the fact that R must be successful
even for tampering functions f that work only for very sparse input lengths {1, 2, 22, 222 , . . .}.
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In this way, we can essentially guarantee that the reduction queries at most a single input
length ` which is greater than log(n) and at most poly(n). We now consider two cases: Either
for this input length ` it is the case that NC circuits can distinguish encodings of 0 and 1
with probability at least 3/4, or for this input length ` it is the case that NC circuits can
distinguish encodings of 0 and 1 with probability at most 1− 1/poly(n). If we are in the first
case, then we can actually honestly run the attack using a NC circuit (in this case we just
use the distinguisher to guess the value of the encoding and succeed with probability 3/4). If
we are in the second case, then we can use Impagliazzo’s Hard Core Set [55] to find a set of
encodings such that a NC circuit can distinguish random encodings of 0 and 1 from this set
with probability at most 1/2 + 1/poly(n). In this case, we modify the tampering function to
hardcode random encodings from the hard core set and return these in response to the queries
from R. Note that to obtain contradiction to the security of the constructed non-malleable
code, we now require that when the reduction R is composed with any tampering circuit
in NC, then the composed circuit is still in NC. This property holds for NC, but not NC1,
which is why our result on ruling out non-security preserving reductions holds only for NC.
1.4 Related Work
Non-Malleable Codes
Non-malleable codes (NMC) were introduced in the seminal work of Dziembowski, Pietrzak
and Wichs [43]. In the same paper they pointed out the simple impossibility result for
NMC for all polynomial tampering functions. Since then NMC have been studied in the
information-theoretic as well as computational settings. Liu and Lysyanskaya [64] studied
the split-state classes of tampering functions and constructed computationally secure NMC
for split-state tampering. A long line of work followed in both the computational [2] as
well as information theoretic setting with a series of advances – reduced number of states,
improved rate, or adding desirable features to the scheme [42, 4, 31, 3, 8, 2, 26, 58, 62, 63, 7].
Recently efficient NMC have been constructed for tampering function classes other than
split-state tampering [17, 9, 29, 45, 18, 15, 16, 19, 32] in both the computational and
information-theoretic setting. Additionally, [43, 33, 48] present various inefficient, existential
or randomized constructions for more general classes of tampering functions. These results
are sometimes presented as efficient constructions in a random-oracle or CRS model. Other
works on non-malleable codes include [46, 34, 24, 6, 57, 40, 47, 3, 25, 23, 60, 38, 5, 39, 59, 65,
61, 44, 27, 30, 68, 35].
Bounds on Non-Malleable Codes
Surprisingly, understanding the limitations and bounds on NMC has received relatively
less attention. While there have been a few previous works exploring the lower and upper
bounds on NMC and its variants [43, 33, 23, 38, 37], most of the effort has been focused on
understanding and/or improving the bounds on the rates of NMC [2, 9, 8, 58, 63, 35]
Perhaps the closest to this work are the results of [33, 38, 37]. Cheragachi and
Guruswami [33] studied the “capacity” of non-malleable codes in order to understand
the optimal bounds on the efficiency of non-malleable codes. They showed that information
theoretically secure efficient NMC exist for tampering families F of size |F| if loglog|F| ≤ αn
for 0 ≤ α < 1, moreover these NMC have optimal rate of 1− α with error ε ∈ O(1/poly(n)).
Dachman-Soled, Kulkarni, and Shahverdi [38] studied the bounds on the locality of locally
decodable and updatable NMC. They showed that for any locally decodable and updatable
NMC which allows rewind attacks, the locality parameter of the scheme must be ω(1), and
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gave an improved version of [40] construction to match the lower bound in computational
setting. Recently, Dachman-Soled and Kulkarni [37] studied the bounds on continuous non-
malleable codes (CNMC), and showed that 2-split-state CNMC cannot be constructed from
any falsifiable assumption without CRS. They also gave a construction of 2-split-state CNMC
from injective one-way functions in CRS model. Faust et al. [46] showed the impossibility of
constructing information-theoretically secure 2-split-state CNMC.
Black-Box Separations
Impagliazzo and Rudich [56] showed the impossibility of black-box reductions from key
agreement to one-way function. Their oracle separation technique subsequently led to
sequence of works, ruling out black-box reductions between different primitives. Notable
examples are [71] separating collision resistant hash functions from one way functions, and [53]
ruling out oblivious transfer from public key encryption. The meta-reduction technique
(cf. [36, 66, 51, 49, 67, 52, 1, 70, 20, 50]) has been used for ruling out larger classes of reductions
– where the construction is arbitrary (non-black-box), but the reduction uses the adversary
in a black-box manner. The meta-reduction technique is often used to provide evidence
that construction of a cryptographic primitive is impossible under “standard assumptions”
(e.g. falsifiable or non-interactive assumptions).
2 Preliminaries
2.1 Notation
For any positive integer n, [n] := {1, . . . , n}. For a vector x ∈ χ of length n, we denote
its hamming weight by ‖ x ‖0:= |{xi : xi 6= 0 for i ∈ [n]}|, where |S| is the cardinality of
set S, and xi denotes the i-th element of x. For x, y ∈ {0, 1}n define their distance to
be d(x, y) := ‖ x− y ‖0. (I.e. x and y are ε-far if d(x, y) ≥ ε.) We denote the statistical
distance between two random variables, X and Y , over a domain S to be ∆(X,Y ) :=
1/2
∑
s∈S |Pr [X = s]− Pr [Y = s]|, where | · | denotes the absolute value. We say X and Y
are ε-close, denoted by X≈εY , if ∆(X,Y ) ≤ ε.
2.2 Non-Malleable Codes
I Definition 1 (Coding Scheme [43]). A Coding scheme, (E,D), consists of a (possibly
randomized) encoding function E : {0, 1}k → {0, 1}n and a deterministic decoding function
D : {0, 1}n → {0, 1}k ∪ {⊥} such that ∀m ∈ {0, 1}k,Pr [D(E(m)) = m] = 1 (over randomness
of E).
We define the distance of a randomized coding scheme by considering the minimum
distance of all codes formed as follows: for each message x ∈ {0, 1}k choosing an arbitrary
codeword corresponding to that message, cx ∈ {E(x; r)}r∈{0,1}∗ . We take the distance of the
randomized encoding scheme to be the maximum of all such minimum distances (i.e. the
distance of the best sub-code).
I Definition 2 (Distance of a Coding Scheme). The distance of a (randomized) coding scheme,
(E,D), is
max
S⊂{c=E(x;r):x∈{0,1}k,r∈{0,1}∗}:
∀x∈{0,1}k,∃cx∈S:Pr[D(cx)=x]>1/2
min
cx,cy∈S:
x6=y∈{0,1}k
‖cx − cy‖0
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Note that this definition can be extended to arbitrary alphabets. Moreover, it is clear that
the minimum distance any coding scheme with K messages and codeword space Σn is upper
bounded by the maximum of the traditional notion of minimum distance in (non-randomized)
codes with the same parameters: the minimum distance between codewords from a code
(over Σn with K distinct code words).
I Definition 3 (ε-Non-malleability [43]). Let F be some family of functions. For each function
f ∈ F , and m ∈ {0, 1}k, define the tampering experiment:
Tamperfm
def=
{
c← E(m), c˜ := f(c), m˜ := D(c˜).
Output : m˜.
}
,
where the randomness of the experiment comes from E. We say a coding scheme (E,D) is
ε-non-malleable with respect to F if for each f ∈ F , there exists a distribution Df over
{0, 1}k ∪ {same∗,⊥} such that for every message m ∈ {0, 1}k, we have
Tamperfm≈ε

m˜← Df .
Output : m if m˜ = same∗;
otherwise m˜.

Here the indistinguishability can be either statistical or computational.
I Lemma 4 (Lemma 2 [42]). Let (E,D) be a coding scheme with E : {0, 1} → X and
D : X → {0, 1}. Let F be a set of functions f : X → X . Then (E,D) is ε-non-malleable with
respect to F if and only if for every f ∈ F ,
Pr
b←{0,1}
[D(f(E(b))) = 1− b] ≤ 12 + ε,
where the probability is over the uniform choice of b and the randomness of E.
I Definition 5 (ε-Malleable Code). Let (E,D) be a coding scheme with E : {0, 1} → X and
D : X → {0, 1}. Let F be a set of functions f : X → X . Then (E,D) is ε-malleable with
respect to F , if ∃f ∈ F such that,
Pr
b←{0,1}
[D(f(E(b))) = 1− b] ≥ 12 + ε,
where the probability is over the uniform choice of b and the randomness of E.
2.3 Input/Output Local Functions
We next define input and output local functions. In input local functions, each input bit
can affect a bounded number of output bits. In output local functions, each output bit is
affected by a bounded number of input bits. Loosely speaking, an input bit xi affects the
output bit yj if for any boolean circuit computing f , there is a path in the underlying DAG
from xi to yj . The formal definitions are below, and our notation follows that of [12].
I Definition 6 ( [17]). We say that a bit xi affects the boolean function f ,
if ∃ {x1, x2, · · ·xi−1, xi+1, · · ·xn} ∈ {0, 1}n−1 such that,
f(x1, x2, · · ·xi−1, 0, xi+1, · · ·xn) 6= f(x1, x2, · · ·xi−1, 1, xi+1, · · ·xn).
Given a function f = (f1, . . . , fn) (where each fj is a boolean function), we say that input
bit xi affects output bit yj, or that output bit yj depends on input bit xi, if xi affects fj.
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I Definition 7 (Input Locality [17]). A function f : {0, 1}n → {0, 1}n is said to have input
locality ` if every input bit fi is affects at most ` output bits.
I Definition 8 (Output Locality [17]). A function f : {0, 1}n → {0, 1}n is said to have output
locality m if every output bit fi is dependent on at most m input bits.
I Definition 9 (Input Local Functions [12]). A function f : {0, 1}n → {0, 1}n is said to be
`-input local, f ∈ Local`, if it has input locality `.
I Definition 10 (Output Local Functions [12]). A function f : {0, 1}n → {0, 1}n is said to be
m-output local, f ∈ Localm, if it has output locality m.
Recall that NC1 is the class of functions where each output bit can be computed by a
efficiently and uniformly generated poly(n) size boolean circuit with O(log n) depth and
constant fan-in, where n is the input size. NC is the class of functions where each output
is computed by a uniformly and efficiently generated poly log(n) depth poly(n) size circuit.
nu− NC is the class of functions computed by a poly log(n) depth poly(n) size circuit.
I Definition 11 (Pseudorandom Generator [41]). Let n, n′ ∈ N such that n′ > n, and let
PRG = {prgn : {0, 1}n → {0, 1}n
′} be a family of deterministic functions which can be
computed in computational class C1. We say PRG is a C1-pseudorandom generator for C2 if
for any D := {Dn : {0, 1}n′ → {0, 1}} ∈ C2:
|Pr [Dn(prgn(x)) = 1]− Pr [Dn(r) = 1]| ≤ negl(n),
where x← {0, 1}n and r ← {0, 1}n′ are sampled uniform randomly.
For class C, if C1 = C2 = C then we simply call it C-pseudorandom generator.
2.4 Distributional Problems
I Definition 12 (Distributional Problem). A distributional problem is a decision problem
along with ensembles (Ψ = {Ψn}∞n=1, L = {Ln}∞n=1) for n ∈ N, where Ψn is probability
distribution over {0, 1}n. The decision problem is to decide whether s ∈ Ln where, s← Ψn.
For a string s ∈ {0, 1}n, we define L(s) to output 1, if and only if s ∈ Ln.
Note that length of s need not be n.
We say distributional problem (Ψ = {Ψn}∞n=1, L = {Ln}∞n=1) is in P if L ∈ P. We say
it is efficiently samplable if there is a randomized poly-time algorithm that on input 1n
samples Ψn.
I Definition 13 (ε(n)-Hard Distributional Problem). Let (Ψ = {Ψn}∞n=1, L = {Ln}∞n=1)
be a distributional problem, we say that (Ψ, L) is ε(n)-hard for family of boolean circuits
C = {Cn}∞n=1, if and only if for every circuit Cn ∈ C,
Pr
x←Ψn
[Cn(x) = Ln(x)] ≤ 12 + ε(n)
I Definition 14 (ε(n)-Easy Distributional Problem). Let (Ψ = {Ψn}∞n=1, L = {Ln}∞n=1)
be a distributional problem, we say that (Ψ, L) is ε(n)-easy for family of boolean circuits
C = {Cn}∞n=1, if there exists some circuit Cn ∈ C,
Pr
x←Ψn
[Cn(x) = Ln(x)] ≥ 12 + ε(n)
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2.5 Hardness of Boolean Functions and Composition
I Definition 15 (δ-hardness of boolean function). Let f : {0, 1}n → {0, 1} be a boolean
function, and Un be uniform distribution over {0, 1}n. Also let 0 < δ < 12 , and n ≤ s ≤ 2
n
n .
We say f is δ-hard for size s if for any boolean circuits C of size at most s
Pr
x←Un
[C(x) = f(x)] ≤ 1− δ.
I Definition 16 (ε-hard-core function). Let f : {0, 1}n → {0, 1} be a boolean function, and
DS be a distribution over {0, 1}n induced by the characteristic function of set S ⊂ {0, 1}n4.
We call f ε-hard-core on S for size s (where n ≤ s ≤ 2nn ), if for any boolean circuits C of
size at most s
Pr
x←DS
[C(x) = f(x)] < 12 · (1 + ε).
We also present the following theorem from [55].
I Theorem 17 (Theorem 1 [55]). Let f : {0, 1}n → {0, 1} be boolean function that δ-hard
for size s. Also, let ε > 0. Then ∃ set S ⊆ {0, 1}n and constant c, such that |S| ≥ δ · 2n and
f is ε-hard-core on S for circuits of size s′ ≤ c · ε2 · δ2 · s.
I Definition 18 (Hard Core Set (HCS) Amenable). We say that F = {Fn}∞n=1 is
HCS-Amenable if for any polynomial p(·), it holds that if C1, . . . , Cp(n) ∈ Fn then
MAJ(C1, . . . , Cp(n)) ∈ Fn.
We now present definitions of functionalities Unroll and Replace which will then allow us
to define the appropriate notions of composition and closure for function classes.
I Definition 19 (Unroll functionality.). Let F := {fn}∞n=1 ∈ F , where fn : {0, 1}n → {0, 1}
and G = {gm}∞m=1 ∈ G, where gm : {0, 1}m → {0, 1}m, be function families. Also let t, p be
polynomials. Let m ∈ poly(n). Let FG denote families functions fn : {0, 1}n → {0, 1} ∈ F
which contains at most t(n) oracle gates computing gm : {0, 1}m → {0, 1}m ∈ G and get
string of length p(n) as non-uniform advice. On an n-bit input, consider the DAG whose
left side consists of the circuit of fn and whose right side consists of circuits gn1 , . . . , gnt(n) .
The values of wires going from the left to the right correspond to (a topological ordering of)
the oracle queries x1, . . . , xt(n) of lengths n1, . . . , nt(n), made in each of the t(n) queries. For
i ∈ [t(n)], circuit gni takes as input xi and returns yi. The values of wires going from the
right to the left correspond to the responses y1, . . . , yt(n). We say that this DAG, denoted
Unroll(FG), is an unrolling of FG(x).
IDefinition 20 (Replace Functionality.). Consider replacing each gni , i ∈ [t(n)], in Unroll(FG)
with a circuit g′ni that takes input (x1, . . . , xi) and produces output yi. This is denoted by
Replace(Unroll(FG), g′n1 , . . . , g′nt(n)).
I Definition 21 ((G, t, `, u)-closure of F). Let F := {fn}∞n=1 ∈ F , where fn : {0, 1}n → {0, 1}
and G = {gm}∞m=1 ∈ G, where gm : {0, 1}m → {0, 1}m, be function families. Also let t, `, u
be polynomials, and `(n) ≤ m ≤ u(n). Let fngm denote function fn : {0, 1}n → {0, 1} which
has access to the output of gm : {0, 1}m → {0, 1}m on at most t(n) inputs of its choice.
We say that F is (G, t, `, u)-closed under compositions if for every F ∈ F such that
for all G ∈ G, Unroll(FG) ∈ F , we have that for all G′ ∈ G and all g′n1 , . . . , g′nt(n) ∈ G′,
Replace(Unroll(FG), g′n1 , . . . , g′nt(n)) ∈ F .
4 Characteristic function of set S outputs 1 if the input to the function is in set S.
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I Definition 22 ((G, t)-closure of F under Strong Composition). Let F := {fn}∞n=1 ∈ F ,
where fn : {0, 1}n → {0, 1} and G = {gm}∞m=1 ∈ G, where gm : {0, 1}m → {0, 1}m, be
function families. Also let t, p be polynomials. Let m ∈ poly(n). Let FG denote families
functions fn : {0, 1}n → {0, 1} ∈ F which contains at most t(n) oracle gates computing
gm : {0, 1}m → {0, 1}m ∈ G
We say that F is (G, t)-closed under compositions if for every F ∈ F we have that for all
G,G′ ∈ G and all g′1, . . . , g′t(n) ∈ G′, Replace(Unroll(FG), g′1, . . . , g′t(n)) ∈ F .
2.6 Black Box Reductions
I Definition 23 (Black-Box-Reduction). We say R is an (F, , δ)-black-box reduction from
a (single bit) non-malleable code, (E,D) = {(En,Dn)}∞n=1, to a distributional problem,
(Ψ, L) = {(Ψn, Ln)}∞n=1, if the following hold:
1. For every set of circuits {fn}∞n=1 parameterized by input length n such that fn achieves
(n)-malleability, for non-negligible , i.e.
Pr
b
u←{0,1}
[Dn(fn(En(b))) = 1− b] > 12 + (n),
then Rf solves {(Ψn, Ln)}∞n=1 with advantage δ(n), where δ is non-negligible. I.e.
Pr
x←Ψn
[Ln(x) = R{fk}
∞
k=1(x)] > 12 + δ(n).
2. If {fn}∞n=1 ∈ F , then R{fk}
∞
k=1(x) ∈ F .
We say a reduction R is length-preserving if R, on input of length n is only allowed to
make queries to oracles with security parameter n. Namely,
Pr
x←Ψn
[Ln(x) = Rfn(x)] >
1
2 + δ(n).
We say a reduction R is approximately length-preserving if there are polynomials p(·), q(·)
such that R, on input of length n is only allowed to make queries to oracles with security
parameter k ∈ [p(n), q(n)]. Namely,
Pr
x←Ψn
[Ln(x) = R{fk}
q(n)
k=p(n)(x)] > 12 + δ(n).
We say a reduction is in NC1 if it can be written as a family of circuits of O(logn)-depth,
poly(n)-size.
3 2-Message NMC against d− 1 arbitrary errors
In this section, we show that when the message space has size 2 (i.e. single bit messages),
non-malleable codes are possible against d − 1 arbitrary errors, whereas error correcting
codes can tolerate at most (d− 1)/2 arbitrary errors. In the next section, we will show that
if the message space is increased to 3 or more, then non-malleable codes are impossible even
against d/2 errors.
The construction is simply a repetition code (E,D). On input a bit b, E outputs the string
bd (the bit b repeated d times). On input a string b1, . . . , bd, D outputs 1 if there is some
i ∈ [d] such that bi = 1. Otherwise, D outputs 0. Note that this code has distance d.
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We next prove that (E,D) is a 0-non-malleable code (i.e. the two distributions in the
security definition for non-malleable codes–see Definition 3–are identical). Applying Lemma 4,
it is sufficient to show that for every tampering function f that modifies at most d−1 symbols,
Pr
b←{0,1}
[D(f(E(b))) = 1− b] ≤ 12 ,
We will use the fact that for the decode algorithm defined above,
Pr[D(f(E(1))) = 0] = 0,
since a tampering function that modifies at most d− 1 bits cannot flip a 1 codeword to a
tampered codeword that decodes to 0 under D.
Therefore,
Pr
b←{0,1}
[D(f(E(b))) = 1− b] = 12 Pr[D(f(E(0))) = 1] +
1
2 Pr[D(f(E(1))) = 0]
= 12 Pr[D(f(E(0))) = 1]
≤ 12 .
This completes the proof.
4 Unconditional Negative Results
In this section we demonstrate that non-malleable codes are impossible to construct for 3
different classes. The first impossibility result holds for message spaces of size greater than 2
(which is tight, given the result in Section 3), the second and third impossibility results hold
even for a single bit.
4.1 Functions that Modify Half the Max Minimum Distance
Let (E,D) be a coding scheme with distance d. Define the class of functions Fd/2−1 = {f : f
changes < d/2 codeword symbols }. We know that ECC exist, and thus NMC also exist, for
Fd/2−1 (e.g. Reed Solomon Codes achieve this bound).
We now define the slightly larger class Fd/2 = {f : f changes ≤ d/2 symbols}. In
Theorem 24 we show that even inefficient NMC do not exist for Fd/2. Recall that distance for
randomized coding schemes is upper bounded by the notion of distance for (non-randomized)
codes with the same message/codeword-space parameters. Specifically, for a set of codewords
S, we define the distance of S (dist(S)) as the minimum pairwise distance over all pairs
of codewords in S. Let S, be the set that consists of all sets S that contain exactly one
codeword for each message in the message space. Then the distance of the code is defined
as maxS∈S dist(S). Refer to definition 2 for formal definition of distance of coding scheme,
presented earlier. Intuitively, we want that a code with distance d, ensures that any 2
codewords which are at least d distance apart decode to distinct messages. Therefore,
first consider a set of codewords which contains at least one codeword corresponding to
each message in the message space such that decoding that specific codeword returns the
corresponding message with probability greater than 1/2. Now consider the minimum of
pairwise distances for the codewords in this set (say d′). Note that, if the distance of the
code is set to d′, then for this particular set, we will ensures that any 2 codewords which are
at least d′ apart decode to distinct messages with high probability. Further, if we take the
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maximum over all such distances d′ corresponding to each set of codewords and call that
value d as the distance of the code, then for any 2 codewords which are at least d apart
decode to distinct messages with high probability.
I Theorem 24. Let (E,D) be a coding scheme with message space of size greater than 2,
alphabet Σ and distance d. Then, for any  > 0, (E,D) is not a 18 − -NMC for Fd/2.
Proof. We begin with some notation Given α, β ∈ Σn, we denote by ‖α− β‖0 the number
of positions i ∈ [n] such that αi 6= βi.
Let (E : U → V,D : V → U) be a randomized encoding scheme, where U ⊆ Σk, V ⊆ Σn
and |U | > 2.
B Claim 25. ∃x ∈ U such that ∀cx ∈ E(x) there is a z = z(cx) ∈ V :
1. ‖cx − z‖0 ≤ d2
2. Pr[D(z) 6= x] =≥ 12 .
Assuming the claim, consider the following tampering function f ∈ Fd/2. Let zc be the z for
each c ∈ E(x∗) guaranteed to exist for some x∗ ∈ U by the above claim.
f(c) :=
{
zc if c ∈ E(x∗)
c otherwise
Let Prcx∗←E(x∗)[D(z(cx∗)) 6= x∗] = p ≥ 12 . Then, ∃y∗ 6= x∗ ∈ U such that
Prcx∗←E(x∗)[D(z(cx∗)) = y∗] ≤ p|U |−1 , but Pr[D(f(E(y∗))) = y∗] = 1. This means that
a distribution Dfx∗ that exactly agrees with D(f(E(·))) on x∗ must output same∗ or x∗ with
probability 1−p and y∗ with probability at most p|U |−1 . A distributionDfy∗ that exactly agrees
with D(f(E(·))) on y∗ must output same∗ or y∗ with probability 1. Thus, any distribution
Df can only agree with D(f(E(·))) for both x∗ and y∗ at most (1− p) + p|U |−1 ≤ 3/4 fraction
of the time (and must have statistical distance at least 1/8 from one of them), since p ≥ 1/2
and |U | > 2.
Next we prove the claim.
Proof. Suppose for the sake of contradiction that ∀x ∈ U,∃cx ∈ E(x) such that ∀z ∈ V
with ‖cx − z‖0 ≤ d2 it is the case that Pr[D(z) 6= x] < 12 . Fix any such set of codewords
corresponding to all messages S = {cx : ∀z ∈ V ‖cx − z‖0 ≤ d2 =⇒ Pr[D(z) 6= x] < 12}x∈U .
Note that the distance of S (mincx 6=cy∈S ‖cx−cy‖0) is at most d (by definition of the distance
of a randomized code). Let cx 6= cy ∈ U be two such codewords such that ‖cx − cy‖ ≤ d.
Then, ∃z ∈ V such that ‖z − cx‖0 ≤ d/2 and ‖z − cy‖0 ≤ d/2. But then by assumption it
follows that Pr[D(z) = x] > 12 and Pr[D(z) = y] >
1
2 , which is a contradiction because x 6= y.
C
J
We observe that a randomized coding scheme with message spaceM, codeword space
C and distance d (as defined above for randomized coding schemes), implies a (possibly
inefficient) error correcting code with the same message/codeword space that can correct
up to d/2− 1 errors. To see this, note that one can take the set S ∈ S (as in the definition
of distance for randomized coding schemes) achieving the maximum dist(S). Since S ⊆ C
contains exactly one codeword for each message in the message space, the set S itself
comprises a code with message spaceM, codeword space C and distance d. This, in turn,
implies a (possibly inefficient) error correcting code with message spaceM and codeword
space C that can correct up to d/2− 1 errors. We thus obtain the following corollary:
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I Corollary 26. Fix a message spaceM and a codeword space C. If the optimal (inefficient)
error-correcting code for (M, C) can correct at most t errors, then there is no non-malleable
code with message spaceM and codeword space C against tampering class Ft+1.
4.2 Input-Local Functions
We rule out non-malleable codes for input-local functions (see Section 2.3 for formal definition),
where each input symbol affects ` output symbols and ` is the locality parameter. We show
that even for ` = 1, non-malleability is impossible to achieve. The specific tampering
functions used in our proof fix all but one of the codeword symbols to constant values. So we
can alternately view this result as building on the previous impossibility result: If one allows
fixing codeword symbols to constants, then one cannot achieve non-malleability against
functions where even a single output symbol’s value depends on the input.
I Theorem 27. Let (E,D) be a coding scheme with message space of at least 2 and alphabet
Σ. Then, for any  > 0, (E,D) is not a 1/2− -NMC for Local1.
Proof. Let U ⊆ {0, 1}k, V ⊆ {0, 1}n where |U | > 1. Let (E : U → V,D : V → U) be
non-malleable code. Take x 6= y ∈ U . Consider cx = E(x), cy = E(y) for some fixed
randomness. By correctness cx 6= cy and moreover, D(cx) 6= D(cy). Also let d := d(cx, cy)
be the distance between cx and cy, note that 0 < d ≤ n. Consider d+ 1 codewords starting
with, c0 = cx, c1, . . . , cd = cy where ∀i ∈ {0, . . . , d− 1}, d(ci, ci+1) = 1. Notice that
D(c0) 6= D(cd) =⇒ ∃j ∈ {0, . . . , d− 1} : D(cj) 6= D(cj+1).
Let x = D(cj) and let y = D(cj+1), where x 6= y. Now, consider the following f ∈ Local1,
f(c) =
{
cj if c ∈ E(y)
cj+1 otherwise
(Note that all symbols except a single one are constant.) Because they have disjoint support,
either D(f(E(x))) or D(f(E(y))) will be at least 1/2-far from any distribution Df . J
4.3 Functions with Large Output Locality
A function f : {0, 1}n → {0, 1}n is (n− log(n))-output-local if each output bit depends on
at most n − log(n) input bits (see Section 2.3 for formal definition). The particular class
F ′ that we use in our lower bound proof is a subclass of all (n − log(n))-local tampering
functions F . Each f ∈ F ′ has the following structure: First, f1, . . . , fn−log(n) (the functions
that output the first n− log(n) bits) are all the same, except that two different bits from
{0, 1} are hardcoded in each. Second, fn−log(n)+1, . . . , fn are also the same, except that a
different value from {0, 1} is hardcoded in each. Finally, the set of input bits upon which
f1, . . . , fn−log(n) depend and the set of input bits upon which fn−log(n)+1, . . . , fn depend are
fixed. Taken together, this means that the total number of functions f in F is at most
4n · 22n−log(n) , so log log |F ′| = n− log(n). On the other hand, Dziembowski et al. [43] showed
existence of a 1/n-non-malleable code for any class F such that log log |F| ≤ n − 2 log(n).
Thus, our lower bound result is nearly tight matching the existential upper bound. In our
theorem, we prove a more general statement:
I Theorem 28. Let (E,D) be a coding scheme with E : {0, 1} → {0, 1}n and D : {0, 1}n →
{0, 1}. Let F be the class of (n− log(1/) + 2)-output- local functions, where 1/8 ≥  ≥ 1/2n.
Then (E,D) is -malleable with respect to F .
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Note that the parameters discussed above can be obtained by setting  = 14n .
Additionally, note that non-malleable codes whose decode function D may output values
in {0, 1,⊥} imply non-malleable codes whose decode function D may only output values in
{0, 1}. Thus, ruling out the latter implies ruling out the former and only makes our result
stronger.
Proof. Fix an arbitrary (E,D) with E : {0, 1} → {0, 1}n and D : {0, 1}n → {0, 1}. Our
analysis considers two cases and shows that for each case, there exists f ∈ F such that
Pr
b←{0,1}
[D(f(E(b))) = 1− b] ≥ 12 + .
By Definition 5, this is sufficient to prove Theorem 28.
We begin with some notation and the proceed to the case analysis. For codeword
c = c1, . . . , cn, let ctop (resp. cbot) denote the first n− log(1/) + 2 bits (resp. last log(1/)−2
bits) of c. I.e. ctop := c1, . . . , cn−log(1/)+2 (cbot := cn−log(1/)+3, . . . , cn). For t ∈ N, let St
denote the set of all t-bit strings and let Ut denote the uniform distribution over t bits.
Assume n ≥ 2.
Case 1.
Pr
b←{0,1}
[D(ctop||r) = b | c← E(b), r ← Ulog(1/)−2] ≥ 1/2 + .
Let c∗,0 = c∗,01 , . . . , c∗,0n (resp. c∗,1 = c
∗,1
1 , . . . , c
∗,1
n ) be the lexicographically first string
that decodes to 0 (resp. 1) under D (i.e. D(c∗,0) = 0 and D(c∗,1) = 1.
In this case we consider the following distribution over tampering circuits f = f1, . . . , fn,
where fi outputs the i-th bit of f :
Sample r ← Ulog(1/)−2, construct circuits fi for each i ∈ [n], which take input ctop and
output c′i. Each fi does the following:
Compute d := D(ctop||r).
Output c′i = c
∗,1−d
i .
We now analyze Prb←{0,1}[D(f(E(b))) = 1− b].
Pr
b←{0,1}
[D(f(E(b))) = 1− b] = Pr
b←{0,1}
[f(E(b)) outputs c∗,1−b]
= Pr
b←{0,1}
[D(ctop||r) = b | c← E(b), r ← Ulog(1/)−2]
≥ 1/2 + ,
where the two equalities follow from the definition of the tampering function f , and the
inequality follows since we are in Case 1. This implies the -malleability of (E,D).
Case 2.
Pr
b←{0,1}
[D(ctop||r) = 1− b | c← E(b), r ← Ulog(1/)−2] ≥ 1/2− .
In this case we consider the following distribution over tampering circuits f = f1, . . . , fn,
where fi outputs the i-th bit of f :
The first n − log(1/) + 2 circuits (f1, . . . , fn−log(1/)+2) simply compute the identity
function: I.e. fi for i ∈ [n− log(1/) + 2] takes ci as input and produces ci as output.
We next describe the distribution over circuits fi for i ∈ {n− log(1/)+3, . . . , n}. Sample
r′ ← [1/(4)− 1]. Construct circuits fi for each i ∈ {n− log(1/) + 3, . . . , n} that take
input cbot and produce output c′i. Each fi does the following:
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Let r := rn−log(1/)+3, . . . , rn be the r′-th lexicographic string in the set Slog(1/)−2 \
{cbot}5.
Output c′i = ri.
We now analyze Prb←{0,1}[D(f(E(b))) = 1− b].
Since we are in Case 2 we have that:
1/2−  ≤ Pr
b←{0,1}
[D(ctop||r) = 1− b | c← E(b), r ← Ulog(1/)−2]
= Pr
b←{0,1}
[
cbot = r |
c← E(b), r ← Ulog(1/)−2
]
· Pr
b←{0,1}
[
D(ctop||r) = 1− b |
cbot = r ∧ c← E(b), r ← Ulog(1/)−2
]
+ Pr
b←{0,1}
[
cbot 6= r |
c← E(b), r ← Ulogn
]
· Pr
b←{0,1}
[
D(ctop||r) = 1− b |
cbot 6= r ∧ c← E(b), r ← Ulog(1/)−2
]
= Pr
b←{0,1}
[
cbot = r |
c← E(b), r ← Ulog(1/)−2
]
· 0
+ Pr
b←{0,1}
[
cbot 6= r |
c← E(b), r ← Ulog(1/)−2
]
· Pr
b←{0,1}
[
D(ctop||r) = 1− b |
cbot 6= r ∧ c← E(b), r ← Ulog(1/)−2
]
= Pr
b←{0,1}
[
cbot 6= r |
c← E(b), r ← Ulog(1/)−2
]
· Pr
b←{0,1}
[
D(ctop||r) = 1− b |
cbot 6= r ∧ c← E(b), r ← Ulog(1/)−2
]
= (1− 4) · Pr
b←{0,1}
[
D(ctop||r) = 1− b |
cbot 6= r ∧ c← E(b), r ← Ulog(1/)−2
]
.
Note that
Pr
b←{0,1}
[
D(ctop||r) = 1− b |
cbot 6= r ∧ c← E(b), r ← Ulog(1/)−2
]
= Pr
b←{0,1}
[D(f(E(b))) = 1− b].
Thus, we have that
1/2−  ≤ (1− 4) Pr
b←{0,1}
[D(f(E(b))) = 1− b].
Since
(1/2 + ) · (1− 4) = 1/2 + − 2− 42
≤ 1/2− ,
we have that
Pr
b←{0,1}
[D(f(E(b))) = 1− b] ≥ 1/2− 1− 4
≥ 1/2 + .
This implies the -malleability of (E,D). J
5 On NMC via BB Reductions
For the formal definition of a (F, , δ)-black-box reduction from a (single bit) non-malleable
code, (E,D) = {(En,Dn)}∞n=1, to a distributional problem, (Ψ, L) = {(Ψn, Ln)}∞n=1, see
Definition 23 in Section 2.6.
5 Recall that, t ∈ N, let St denote the set of all t-bit strings and let Ut denote the uniform distribution
over t bits.
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A crucial component of our impossibility result will be a lookup circuit that responds to
queries submitted by the reduction with hardwired responses. However, we need the lookup
circuit to maintain consistency: If the reduction queries the same query multiple times, the
same response should be given each time. Such a lookup circuit is trivial to implement
with polynomial-size circuits. However, in our case, we require that this lookup circuit is
implementable in NC1. In the following, we first formally define such a lookup circuit and
then prove that it is implementable in NC1.
I Definition 29 (Look-Up Circuit.). A (`(n), p(n)) lookup circuit consists of `(n) hardwired
values of length p(n) bits, denoted y1, . . . , y`(n). The lookup circuit receives as input
x1, . . . , x`(n), where each xi has length p(n) bits. The circuit outputs `(n) number of p(n)-bit
strings: yi1 , . . . , yi`(n) , where for j ∈ [`(n)], ij is set to the first index k ∈ [`(n)] such that
xj = xk. For example, on input x1, x2, x3, x4, . . ., where x1 = x3 and x2 = x4, the circuit
outputs y1, y2, y1, y2.
I Proposition 30. For p(n), `(n) = O(nc) for some fixed constant c, there exist polynomial
size look-up circuits of depth O(logn).
Sketch. The inputs, x1, . . . , x`−1, can be put in sorted order via a circuit of size O(nc logn)
and depth O(logn) [10]. Then each sorted xi can determine if it is the first of that value
(if x1, . . . , x`−1 are in sorted order then xj is determining that there does not exist xi = xj
such that i < j), by comparing only to one neighboring value. This can be done in parallel.
Finally, compare x` to all xi that pass this test in parallel. If there is such an xi such that
xi = x`, the circuit will output yi. Otherwise, the circuit will output y`. J
We now present the central technical lemma of the section.
I Lemma 31. Assume that F is (F , t, p(n), p(n))-closed under composition (see Defini-
tion 21), and contains (t(n), p(n)) look-up circuits for polynomials t(·), p(·).6 If there is an
(F , 1/2, δ(n))-black-box-reduction making t(n) security parameter-preserving queries from a
(single bit) non-malleable code for F , (E,D) = {(En,Dn)}∞n=1, to a distributional problem,
(Ψ, L) = {(= Ψn, Ln)}∞n=1, then one of the following must hold:
1. (E,D) is δ(n)2t(n) -malleable by F .
2. (Ψ, L) is (δ(n)/2)-easy for F .
Moreover, if (E,D) is efficient, then it suffices that F contains such look-up circuits
generated in uniform polynomial time.
Proof. Let R be such a security parameter-preserving (F , 1/2, δ(n)-reduction, for a non-
malleable code (E,D) and distributional problem (Ψ, L). Moreover, for security parameter n,
let p(n) be the length of the codeword generated by E, where p(·) is a polynomial.
Consider the following tampering functions {fp(n)}p(n) whose behavior on a given
codeword c is defined as follows (where H is a random function H : {0, 1}p(n) → {0, 1}∗ and
H(c) is the randomness used by encoding algorithm):
fp(n)(c) :=
{
En(1;H(c)) if Dn(c) = 0
En(0;H(c)) if Dn(c) = 1
Since, NMC are perfectly correct, we have (for any choice of H)
Pr
b
u←{0,1}
[Dn(fp(n)(E(b))) = 1− b] = 1.
6 p(n) corresponds to the length of the codeword outputted by En.
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Therefore, by our assumption on R we have that for all n,
Pr
x←Ψn
[Ln(x) = Rfp(n)(x)] ≥ 12 + δ(n).
Now, for the j-th oracle query, we define f
′,j
p(n), a stateful simulation of the output of the
tampering function fp(n) on the j-th query. Each f
′,j
p(n) is a (j, p(n)) lookup circuit (with j
number of inputs/outputs of length p(n)) that hardcodes a random codeword (sampled from
E(b) where b is uniform) as the yj value.
By our assumption on F (and R), we have that Replace(Unroll(Rfp(n)), f ′,1p(n), . . . , f
′,t(n)
p(n) ) ∈
F . We will abuse notation and denote the resulting circuit by Rf ′p(n) . So, it suffices to
show that the behavior of Rf
′
p(n)(x) is close that of Rf
H
p(n)(x), for any x, which will imply
that Rf
′
p(n)(x) ∈ F breaks the distributional problem w.h.p., since RfHp(n)(x) does. More
accurately, if (E,D) is δ(n)2t(n) -non-malleable by F , then we will show that
∀n ∈ N,∀x ∈ {0, 1}n,∆(Rf ′n(x);Rfn(x)) ≤ δ(n)/2.
By the above, this then implies that (Ψ, L) is (δ(n)/2)-easy for F .
To show that the outputs of Rf
′
p(n)(x) and Rf
H
p(n)(x) are close, we will use a hybrid
argument, reducing to the δ(n)2t(n) -non-malleablity of (E,D) at every step.
In the i-th hybrid, the function f (i),jp(n) responding to the j-th query is a (j, p(n)) look-up
circuit that hardcodes values yi1, . . . , yij . For k ∈ [t = t(n)], the yik values are sampled as
follows: For k ∈ [t− i], yik is sampled as by fHp(n). For k > t− i, yik is a random encoding of
a random bit. The concatenation of the t circuits for each query is denoted by f (i)p(n). Clearly,
f
(0)
p(n) ≡ fp(n) and f (t)p(n) ≡ f ′p(n).
We will show that for all x ∈ {0, 1}n (and any fixing of random coins r for R)
∆(Rf
(i)
p(n)(x);Rf
(i−1)
p(n) (x)) ≤ δ(n)2t(n) (for i ∈ [t(n)]), which proves the claim above.(R
f
(0)
p(n)(x)
has advantage δ(n) and in each of the subsequent t(n) hybrids we lose at most an (n)
factor.)
Suppose not, then there exists an x (and random coins r, if R is randomized) such that
R’s behavior differs with respect to f (i)p(n) and f
(i−1)
p(n) : |Pr[Rf
(i)
p(n)(x) = 1]− Pr[Rf
(i−1)
p(n) (x) =
1]| ≥ δ(n)2t(n) .
Note that for fixed random function H (that generates the random coins used to sample
the yj values) f (i)p(n) and f
(i−1)
p(n) differ solely on the response to (t− i)-th query. So, fix x, H
and all but the (t− i)-th value yit−i and “hardcode” all other yk values in both cases. The
reason that we can hardcode the yj values except for the (t− i)-th response is the following:
Clearly, up to the (t− i)-th query, the responses can be fully hardcoded since x is fixed and so
all the queries and responses can also be fixed. The yj values hardcoded in the (t− i+ 1)-st
lookup circuit and on can also be fixed, since in both f (i)p(n) and f
(i−1)
p(n) , the (t− i+ 1)-st value
of yj and on is a random codeword, that does not depend on the value encoded in the query
submitted by the reduction. Let sH,x denote the value encoded in the (t − i)-th query in
this hardcoded variant of the hybrid. Note that the value of sH,x is also fixed.
1. In Rf
(i−1)
p(n) (x) all values up to the (t−i)-th response are hardcoded. The (t−i)-th response,
which will be a random encoding of bit 1−sH,x, is not hardcoded. All the other responses
are computed by lookup circuits with hardwired yj values.
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2. In Rf
(i)
p(n)(x), all values up to the (t − i)-th response are hardcoded. The (t − i)-th
response, which will be a random encoding of a random bit, is not hardcoded. All the
other responses are computed by lookup circuits with hardwired yj values.
Thus, we will treat the above as a new function R′H,x(·) that takes as input just the
response to the (t− i)-th query and returns some value. Note that R′H,x(·) is in F , since it
can be viewed as the circuit Rf
(i)
p(n) , with queries/responses to f (i),j , j ∈ [t− i− 1] hardcoded,
the (t− i)-th query hardcoded, the (t− i)-th value yit−i as the input to the circuit, and for
j > t − i, the f (i),j functions as lookup circuits contained in F . Moreover, by the above,
R′H,x(·) distinguishes random codewords that encode the bit 1−sH,x from random codewords
that encode a random bit with advantage (n). Specifically,
Pr[R′H,x(c) = 1 | c← En(1− sH,x)]− Pr[R′H,x(c) = 1 | c← En(b), b← {0, 1}] ≥
δ(n)
2t(n) .
By standard manipulation, the above is equivalent to:
1
2 ·Pr[R
′
H,x(c) = 1 | c← En(1− sH,x)] +
1
2 ·Pr[R
′
H,x(c) = 0 | c← En(sH,x)] ≥
1
2 +
δ(n)
2t(n) .
This implies that we can use R′H,x to construct a distribution over tampering functions
in F that successfully break (E,D). Details follows.
Let csH,x be a codeword encoding bit sH,x and let c1−sH,x be a codeword encoding bit
1− sH,x. Define fˆH,x as follows: fˆH,x hardcodes csH,x and c1−sH,x . On input (codeword) c,
If R′H,x(c) = 1, output csH,x ;
Otherwise, output c1−sH,x .
We now analyze
Pr
b←{0,1}
[Dn(fˆH,x(En(b))) = 1− b].
Pr
b←{0,1}
[D(fˆH,x(E(b))) = 1− b] = Pr[b = 1− sH,x] · Pr[R′H,x(c) = 1 | c← En(1− sH,x)]
+ Pr[b = sH,x] · Pr[R′H,x(c) = 0 | c← En(sH,x)]
= 12 · Pr[R
′
H,x(c) = 1 | c← En(1− sH,x)]
+ 12 · Pr[R
′
H,x(c) = 0 | c← En(sH,x)]
≥ 12 +
δ(n)
2t(n) .
But, the above implies that (E,D) is δ(n)2t(n) -malleable for F .
Therefore, we conclude that either (E,D) is δ(n)2t(n) -malleable for F or the distributional
problem, (Ψ, L) = {(Ψn, Ln)}∞n=1 is (δ(n)/2)-easy for F . J
The following corollary holds since NC1 is (NC1, t, p(n), p(n))-closed under composition
(for all polynomials p(·)), and NC1 contains (t(n), p(n)) lookup circuits for any polynomials
t(·), p(·).
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I Corollary 32. If there is an (NC1, 1/2, δ(n))-black-box-reduction making t(n) security
parameter preserving queries from a (single bit) non-malleable code for NC1, (E,D) =
{(En,Dn)}∞n=1, to a distributional problem, (Ψ, L) = {(Ψn, Ln)}∞n=1, then one of the following
must hold:
1. (E,D) is δ(n)2t(n) -malleable by NC
1.
2. (Ψ, L) is (δ(n)/2)-easy for NC1.
I Note 33. The proof of Lemma 31 (as well as the other proofs in this section), does not
extend to cases in which the reduction R is outside in the class of tampering functions
F . Specifically, in the hybrid arguments, we require that R′H,x(·) is in F . In particular,
our proof approach does not extend to proving impossibility of constructing a (single bit)
non-malleable code for F , from a distributional problem, (Ψ, L) that is hard for some larger
class F . E.g. our techniques do not allow us to rule out constructions of non-malleable codes
for NC1 from a distributional problem that is hard for NC2. Our techniques also do not rule
out constructions of non-malleable codes for F from an “incompressibility”-type assumption,
such as those used in the recent work of [16]. Briefly, if a function ψ is incompressible by
circuit class F , it means that for t n, for any computationally unbounded Boolean function
D : {0, 1}t → {0, 1} and any F : {0, 1}n → {0, 1}t ∈ F , the output of D ◦ F (x1, . . . , xn) is
uncorrelated with ψ(x1, . . . , xn) (over uniform choice of x1, . . . , xn). In our case, this would
mean that the reduction R is allowed oracle access to a computationally unbounded Boolean
function D, since the hardness assumption would still be broken by the reduction as long
as R ∈ F and the query made to D has length t n. Since R composed with D is clearly
outside the tampering class F , our proof approach does not apply in the incompressibility
setting.
I Note 34. We can extend Lemma 31 to rule out (u(n), `(n))-approximately security
parameter preserving reductions by allowing our reduction access to a greater range of
inefficient/simulated tampering functions (defined in the same manner as above): {fk}u(n)k=`(n)
and {f ′k}u(n)k=`(n). In this case, we can, WLOG, conflate the security parameter queried to the
oracle with the length of the query made to the oracle. However, we now require for our
proof that F is (F , t, `, u)-closed under composition and contains look-up circuits with t(n)
inputs, consisting of `(n) to u(n) number of bits, for polynomials t(·), `(·), u(·).
I Lemma 35. Assume F is (F , t, `, u)-closed under composition (see Definition 21) and
contains (t(n), p(n)) look-up circuits for polynomials t(·), p(·). If there is an (F , 1/2, δ(n))-
black-box-reduction making t(n) number of (`(n), u(n))-approximately length preserving
queries, from a (single bit) non-malleable code for F , (E,D) = {(En,Dn)}∞n=1, to a
distributional problem, (Ψ, L) = {(Ψn, Ln)}∞n=1, then one of the following must hold:
1. (E,D) is δ(n)2t(n) -malleable by F .
2. (Ψ, L) is (δ(n)/2)-easy for F .
Moreover, if (E,D) is efficient, then for the conclusion to hold it suffices that F contains
such look-up circuits generated that are generated uniform polynomial time.
The following corollary holds since NC1 is (NC1, t, `, u)-closed under composition, where
`(n) = nγ , for any constant γ ≤ 1, u(n) = nc, for any constant c ≥ 1 and NC1 contains
look-up circuits with t(n) number of inputs of length `(n) to u(n)-bits for polynomials t(·),
`(·), u(·).
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I Corollary 36. Fix constants γ ≤ 1, c ≥ 1. If there is an (NC1, 1/2, δ(n))-black-box-reduction
making t(n) (nγ , nc)-approximately length preserving queries from a (single bit) non-malleable
code for NC1, (E,D) = {(En,Dn)}∞n=1, to a distributional problem, (Ψ, L) = {(Ψn, Ln)}∞n=1,
then one of the following must hold:
1. (E,D) is δ(n)2t(n) -malleable by NC
1.
2. (Ψ, L) is (δ(n)/2)-easy for NC1.
We extend to non-security parameter preserving reductions, but require a stronger
compositional property for the tampering class F . As for approximate security parameter
preserving reductions, WLOG we may conflate the security parameter queried to the oracle
with the length of the query made to the oracle.
I Lemma 37. Let F be closed under strong composition (see Definition 22) and contain
(t(n), u(n)) lookup circuits. If for every non-negligible , there is an (F , , δ(n))-black-
box-reduction (for some non-negligble δ) making t(n) queries from an (single bit) (n)-
non-malleable code for F , (E,D) = {(En,Dn)}∞n=1, to a distributional problem, (Ψ, L) =
{(Ψn, Ln)}∞n=1, then (Ψ, L) is not (δ(n)− t(n) · (n))-hard for F .
Proof. Let S := {1, 21, 221 , 2221 , . . .}. Let (n) be the following non-negligible function:
(n) :=
{ 1
4 if n ∈ S
0 if n /∈ S
Assume there is some reduction R that succeeds with non-negligible probability δ := δ(n)
for this . Since δ is non-negligible, there must be an infinite set S ′ such that δ(n) ≥ 1/nc
for some constant c and for all n ∈ S ′.
WLOG, we may assume that the reduction R, on input of length n, queries at most a
single input length `(n) ∈ ω(log(n)), whereas all other queries are of input length O(log(n))
(since we may assume the oracle simply returns strings of all 0’s on any input of length k /∈ S).
Additionally, we may assume that (1) `(n) is polynomial in n (since otherwise the reduction
does not have time to even write down the query) and (2) for any k ∈ N, the size of the set
`−1(k) ∩ S ′ is finite (otherwise we can hardcode all possible query/responses for a particular
input length k into the reduction–which is constant size since k is constant–and obtain a
circuit that breaks the underlying hard problem on an infinite number of input lengths).
Moreover, we assume WLOG that `(n) < n, since otherwise our previous proof holds.
Since by assumption F is HCS-amenable, it means that Impagliazzo’s hardcore set holds
for adversaries in F . Specifically, for random codewords c← E`(n)(b), b← {0, 1} of length
` = `(n) s.t. `(n) < n, there are two possible cases:
1. For infinitely many n ∈ S ′ (this set of values is denoted by S ′′ ⊆ S ′), there is some
adversary in F := {Fn}n∈N that outputs D`(n)(c) with probability at least 3/47.
2. For infinitely many n ∈ S ′ (this set of values is denoted by S ′′ ⊆ S ′), there is some
hardcore set H of size at least ′(n) · 2`, where ′(n) = 12·nc·t(n) such that every adversary
in F := {Fn}n∈N outputs D`(n)(c) with probability at most 1/2 + ′(n), when c is chosen
at random from H8.
7 Note that D`(n)(c) takes inputs of length `(n), whereas Fn takes inputs of length n. We can easily
resolve this discrepancy by padding inputs of length `(n) up to n.
8 Again, the input c to D`(n) has length `(n) while Fn takes inputs of length n. As above, we resolve the
discrepancy by padding inputs of length `(n) up to n.
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In Case 1, we set the tampering function {fk}k to use the circuit described above to
decode a random codeword with prob 3/4 and then chooses a random encoding of 0 or
1 appropriately. Additionally, fk only responds if k ∈ S. Clearly, fk succeeds with non-
negligible probability . Since the  function remains the same, we know that δ and `, S, S ′
remain the same.
In this case, as in the previous proof, we can switch to a simulated tampering function
Sim, which responds with f`(n) on query input length `(n) and hardcodes all responses for
all possible queries R makes to fk with input lengths k = k(n) ∈ O(log(n)).
Note that since we are in Case 1, for infinitely many input lengths–input lengths n ∈ S ′′–to
R, RSim, is a circuit in Fn, since Fn strongly composes. Additionally, the behavior of RSim is
identical to the behavior of R{fk}k . Moreover, since fk succeeds with non-negligible , by
assumption on R, it means that for all n ∈ S ′, Rf`(n) agrees with (Ψ, L) with probability
1/2+1/nc. But then we must have that for infinitely many n ∈ S ′–input lengths n ∈ S ′′–RSim
agrees with (Ψ, L) with probability 1/2 + 1/nc and RSim ∈ Fn. So (Ψ, L) is (δ′(n))-easy for
F , where
δ′(n) :=
{ 1
nc if n ∈ S ′′
0 if n /∈ S ′′
In Case 2, we set the tampering function {fk}k to decode the query submitted by the
reduction R and respond with a random encoding from the hardcore set described above (if
it exists), which decodes to 0 or 1 as appropriate. Specifically, the hardcore set H is defined
as follows: fk sets n∗ to be equal to the lexicographically first element in the (finite) set
`−1(k) ∩ S ′′9, and chooses the lexicographically first set H of size ′(n∗) · 2`(n∗) = ′(n∗) · 2k
for which every adversary in Fn outputs D`(n∗)(c) with probability at most 1/2 + ′(n∗),
when c is chosen at random from H. If `−1(k) ∩ S ′ = ∅ or there is no such hardcore set
H, then fk applies the trivial breaking strategy described above (decoding the input and
responding with a random encoding of 0 or 1 as appropriate). Moreover, fk responds only if
k ∈ S. Since the  function remains the same in this case as well, the δ function also remains
the same. Thus, for n ∈ S ′, Rf`(n) must still agree with (Ψ, L) with probability 1/2 + 1/nc.
In this case, as in the previous proof, we can switch to a simulated tampering function
Sim that does not decode but rather chooses a random codeword from the hardcode set
H (which again we can hardcode in using lookup circuits as before). Moreover, for queries
R makes to Sim with input lengths k = k(n) ∈ O(log(n)), all responses for all possible
queries c are hardcoded into Sim. Now, for infinitely many n ∈ S ′–input lengths n ∈ S ′′–R’s
behavior should be t(n) · ′(n)-close when interacting with {fk}k versus Sim, since otherwise
in each hybrid step we can construct a distinguishing circuit in Fn (as in the previous proof)
contradicting the guaranteed hardness of the hardcore set. Finally, we must argue that for
infinitely many n ∈ S ′–input lengths n ∈ S ′′–R composed with Sim is in the class F . But
due to the fact that F is (F , t)-closed under strong composition, this occurs whenever the
reduction is instantiated with security parameter n ∈ S ′′, where n is the lexicographically first
element in the set `−1(`(n)) ∩ S ′′. Since n is always contained in `−1(`(n)), since the size of
`−1(`(n))∩S ′ is finite and since the size of S ′′ is infinite, there will be infinitely many n ∈ S ′′
for which this event occurs. Thus, for infinitely many n ∈ S ′′ (denote this set of values by S˜,
R{fk}k agrees with (Ψ, L) with probability 1/2 + 1/nc and RSim is t(n) · ′(n) ≤ 1/2nc-close
to R{fk}k . So we conclude that (Ψ, L) is (δ′(n))-easy for F , where
δ′(n) :=
{
1
2nc if n ∈ S˜
0 if n /∈ S˜ J
9 Note that it is finite since `−1(k) ∩ S′ is finite and S′′ ⊆ S′.
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The following corollary holds since NC is (NC, t)-closed under strong composition and
Impagliazzo’s HCS holds for NC.
I Corollary 38. If for every non-negligible  = (·), there is an (nu− NC, , δ)-black-box-
reduction, for some non-negligible δ = δ(·), making t(n) queries from a (single bit) non-
malleable code for nu− NC, (E,D) = {(En,Dn)}∞n=1, to a distributional problem, (Ψ, L) =
{(Ψn, Ln)}∞n=1, then (Ψ, L) is (δ′(n))-easy for NC, for some non-negligible δ′ = δ′(·).
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